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Abstract— Wireless Mesh Networks (WMNs) have emerged as 
a key technology for the next generation of wireless networking 
due to its self-forming, self-organizing and self-healing 
properties. However, due to the multi-hop nature of 
communications in WMN, we cannot assume that all nodes in 
the network are cooperative. Nodes may drop all of the data 
packets they received to mount a Denial of Service (DoS) 
attack. In this paper, we proposed a lightweight trust detection 
mechanism called Trusted Entropy and Dempster Shafer 
(TEDS) to mitigate the effects of blackhole attacks. This novel 
idea combines entropy function and Dempster Shafer belief 
theory to derive a trust rating for a node. If the trust rating of 
a node is less than a threshold, it will be blacklisted and 
isolated from the network. In this way, the network can be 
assured of a secure end to end path free of malicious nodes for 
data forwarding. Our proposed idea has been extensively 
tested in simulation using network simulator NS-3 and 
simulation results show that we are able to improve the packet 
delivery ratio with slight increase in normalized routing 
overhead. 
Keywords- wireless mesh networks; information fusion;trust 
system; blackhole attacks. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Wireless Mesh Network (WMNs) are fast gaining 
popularity as the next generation of wireless networking due 
to their low setup cost, ease of implementation, good 
network coverage and self-management capabilities [1]. A 
WMN is made up of two types of nodes: the mesh routers 
and the mesh clients. The mesh routers are statically 
deployed and they form the wireless mesh backbone to 
provide network access for the mesh clients such as your 
laptops, smart phones or tablets, etc. The mesh clients on the 
other hand, can be static or mobile with simpler hardware 
and software requirements. Together, the mesh routers and 
the mesh clients cooperate to carry out packet forwarding 
via multi-hop communications to ensure proper data 
delivery.    
However, due to the openness of the wireless medium 
and the multi-hop nature of communications in WMNs [2], 
we cannot assume all the nodes in the network are 
cooperative and well-behaved. Nodes may act selfishly by 
not forwarding the data packets in order to conserve their 
scarce resources, such as power and bandwidth. Second, the 
use of cryptographic techniques, although can deny 
unauthorized users access to the network, it may not be a 
viable solution as the mesh clients are resource limited. 
Also, if the nodes are compromised, they can retrieve the 
public and private keys used for communications and break 
the cryptography systems. Subsequently, they may conduct 
internal attacks by dropping packets to mount a Denial of 
Service (DoS) attack. If the compromised nodes drop 100% 
of the data packets, it is called a blackhole attack. 
Several works have been proposed in literature [3]-[9] to 
deal with packet droppers or blackhole attacks. Zhang et al. 
[9] use a reputation driven mechanism called EigenTrust 
[10] to evaluate the trust of a node and integrates the trust 
information into an anomaly detection system to identify 
packet droppers in the network. This method, however, 
assumes the presence of prior trustworthy nodes which is 
not practical in WMNs because pre-trusted nodes may 
misbehave to protect their own interests. Proto et al. [7] use 
EigenTrust to compute the trust of a node via a path-wide 
approach. The trust values are transformed into a weighting 
metric in Optimized Link State Routing (OLSR) protocol 
[19] to determine the best path trustworthiness. One issue 
with this approach is that well-behaved nodes are treated 
unfairly. One misbehaved node in the forwarding path will 
result in the decrease of the reputation values of all other 
nodes along the path.  
Marti et al. [6] proposed two mechanisms to detect 
misbehavior in Mobile Ad hoc NETworks (MANETs): 
Watchdog and pathrater. Watchdog uses overhearing 
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Figure 1.  Blackhole Attack 
technique to identify misbehaved neighboring nodes 
whereas pathrater is to keep state about the goodness of 
other nodes in order to decide the most reliable routes 
among the nodes. This method however, suffers from 
badmouthing attack as an attacker can malign a good node 
and cause other nodes to avoid the good node. Shila et al. 
[8] further extend the Watchdog mechanism by enabling 
both upstream and downstream traffic monitoring to 
enhance the detection capabilities in the presence of 
wireless losses. The disadvantage is that misbehaved nodes 
can only be detected by the source node based on the receipt 
of the PROBE ACK message. If PROBE ACK is not 
received by the source, then the source needs to initiate a 
hop by hop query for the PROBE and PROBE ACK packets 
which is going to increase the computational load.  
In [3]-[5], the authors used subjective logic developed by 
Josang [11] to qualify trust where trust is represented by an 
opinion having belief, disbelief and uncertainty. The 
motivation behind this idea is that no one can determine 
with absolute certainty that a proposition is true or false. 
Hence, we can only form subjective opinion which contains 
certain degree of uncertainty regarding the truth of the 
proposition. It allows for better expressiveness and clarity 
than traditional probabilistic logic thereby allowing users to 
specify situations like “I don’t know” or “I’m not sure”. 
While subjective logic is effective in providing accurate 
opinions as it takes into account uncertainty, aggregation of 
trust opinions is complex and it requires high memory 
storage as each node needs to store the belief, disbelief and 
uncertainty parameters.    
Motivated by the limitations of existing approaches, we 
propose a trust based mechanism called Trusted Entropy 
and Dempster Shafer (TEDS), through incorporating with 
Ad hoc On demand Distance Vector (AODV) routing 
protocol [19] to find a secure end to end path free of non-
trusted nodes to safeguard against blackhole nodes. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II 
describes the threat model and assumptions. Section III 
presents the proposed TEDS design. Section IV presents the 
simulation results to demonstrate the performance of TEDS. 
Section V gives the conclusion and future works. 
II. THREAT MODEL AND ASSUMPTIONS 
WMNs are exposed to security threats at any layer of the 
internet protocol stack which can cause the network to 
degrade or malfunction [13][14]. In this paper, we only 
focus on blackhole attacks at the network layer and state our 
assumptions for our TEDS design.  
A. Blackhole Attacks 
In a blackhole attack, the malicious node will advertise 
itself as having the best route to the destination even though 
it does not have a route to it.  It does this by sending a route 
reply (RREP) packet immediately to the source node [14]. 
The source node upon receiving this malicious RREP 
assumes the route discovery is complete and ignores all 
other RREP from other nodes and selects the path that now 
includes the malicious node as a relayer to forward the data 
packets. Subsequently, the malicious node will drop all the 
traffic received. The malicious node thus creates a blackhole 
in the network. An illustration is given in Fig. 1. 
B. Assumptions 
We assume the mesh routers and mesh clients in the 
network are statically deployed to model communications in 
infrastructure based WMNs and the majority of the mesh 
routers are cooperative and well-behaved. We assume that 
the sources and destinations are fully trusted. We further 
assume that the network is strongly connected where there 
are many other alternate paths from the source to the 
destination free of malicious nodes. Next, we assume the 
malicious nodes act independently and they do not collude. 
Therefore, our model is free of attacks, such as cooperative 
blackholes or wormhole attacks or any other forms of 
collusion attacks. The problem of colluding nodes is left as a 
future work. Lastly, trust value in our model is defined in 
the range  0,1 , where trust value of 0 means the node is 
untrusted and trust value of 1 means the nodes is fully 
trusted. Lastly, all nodes at the start of the network assume 
an initial trust value of 0.5. 
III. TEDS DESIGN 
In this section, we present the details of TEDS. Lastly, 
we present our simulation settings with results and 
discussions. 
A. TEDS Overview 
Our proposed model makes use of trust metric to assess 
the trustworthiness of a node in the network and it is based 
on three mechanisms. The three mechanisms are Watchdog 
[6], Shannon entropy function [12] and Dempster Shafer 
Theory [15]. In our scheme, we assume each node starts off 
with a trust value of 0.5 and each node is installed with 
Watchdog functionality to monitor the next hop forwarding 
behavior. The observations gathered from overhearing will 
be used to compute the forwarding probability of each 
neighbor node in the network. We then applied Shannon 
entropy function to compute the uncertainty of this 
  
Figure 2. Watchdog Operation 
 
forwarding probability thereafter, compute the direct trust 
value of each neighbor node. This direct trust value 
represents a node’s direct experiences with its one hop 
neighbor. Next, we apply Dempster Shafer theory to 
combine conflicting trust values coming from a node’s 
direct interactions as well as indirect interactions to 
determine the overall trust value. The indirect interactions in 
our context are defined as indirect trust derived from 
recommendation trust values from other nodes. This overall 
trust value will be calculated periodically (every trust 
interval) which will be feedback to the routing protocol for 
routing decisions. 
B. Calculation of Forwarding Probability 
Each node is installed with Watchdog functionality to 
monitor the number of packets sent and the number of the 
packets overheard. To prevent the trustor (node responsible 
for the evaluation of trust of its downstream node) from 
falsely accusing its neighbor of misbehaving due to the 
inevitable collisions at the sender [6], we proposed that the 
trustor continues to monitor its downstream node for an 
extended period of time which we set to 2 seconds. If the 
trustor still fails to overhear the packet sent out by its 
neighbor after 2 seconds, the trustor concludes that the 
downstream node has dropped the packets maliciously. An 
example of how the watchdog works is given in Fig. 2. Each 
node keeps track of all sent packets by maintaining a table 
containing the ID of the node that the packet is directed to, 
the packet ID and the expiration time which is 2 seconds.  
When the trustor overhears a packet and finds a match in its 
corresponding table, the table entry for the overheard packet 
ID will be deleted. At every trust interval, we compute the 
forwarding probability, pf  using (1). 
 
# of overheard packets sent by n
# of packets send to n  for forwarding
i
p
i
f   (1) 
C. Calculation of Direct Trust 
The next step is to formulate the direct trust value and 
we proposed using the Shannon binary entropy function 
defined in (2) together with a set of mapping equations 
defined in (3) to compute the direct trust values. This will 
ensure that the trust value is bounded by and confined in the 
range [0,1]  and such that low forwarding probabilities 
correspond to lower trust values while high forwarding 
probabilities corresponds to high trust values. 
 
2 2( ) log (1 )log (1 )bH p p p p p      (2) 
1 0.5 ( ),  for 0.5 p 1
0.5 ( ),       for 0 p
H p
DT
H p
  
 
  
 (3) 
where DT denotes the trust value of a node, ( )bH p   
denotes the binary entropy function in (2) and p  denotes 
the forwarding probability derived in Section B. 
D. Update of Direct Trust 
To better reflect the currency of direct trust values, we 
use Exponential Moving Weighted Average (EMWA) [16] 
to combine the past historical trust values of a node with the 
current measured trust values. EMWA applies exponentially 
decreasing weighting factors to each data point so as to 
smooth out the direct trust value and hence it provides a 
better representation of trust values over a period of time. 
EMWA for our trust model is given by (4).  
 
1(1 )t t tDT DT DT        (4) 
 
where    is a constant smoothing factor between 0 and 1, 
tDT  represents the current trust value to be evaluated and  
1tDT   represents the previous trust value recorded by 
TEDS. If the smoothing factor    is large, it discounts the 
older observations faster. For our scheme, the smoothing 
factor   is selected to be 0.667. This means that a higher 
weightage is placed on a node’s current trust value 
compared to the past. The choice of    is chosen to match 
the average age of data in simple moving average (SMA) 
and the formula is given by (5). The proof can be found in 
[17]. 
 
2
1N
 

 (5) 
 
where N  is the number of samples or records considered in 
EMWA. 
E. Calculation of Indirect Trust 
Beside direct trust values, a node could also form an 
indirect trust value based on the recommendation trusts 
from other neighboring nodes, as shown in Fig. 3. Let us 
assume node A’s trust of node B denoted by ABDT  is 0.667 
and node B’s trust of C denoted by BCDT  is 0.3. To 
determine the indirect trust value of node A about C taking 
into consideration node B’s recommendation about node C, 
 
Figure 3. Formulation of Indirect Trust 
 
 node B’s trust of node C has to be weighted by node A’s 
trust of node B according to (7). This is similar to transitive 
trust described in Eigentrust [10] and in subjective logic 
[11]. The purpose is to discount node B’s direct trust of 
node C based on node A’s observation of node B so as to 
mitigate the effects of badmouthing. Using (7), the weighted 
trust value (indirect trust value denoted as IDT) for the 
example given in Fig. 3 will be equal to 0.2. 
 
.AC AB BCIDT DT DT  (7) 
F. Combining Direct Trust and Indirect Trust 
Dempster Shafer theory (DST) [15] is used to combine a 
trustor’s direct trust of a node and indirect trust values 
received from other recommending nodes to arrive at the 
overall trust value of a node. DST is used because it allows 
us to quantify uncertainty in our trust computation instead 
of being forced to use prior probabilities to add up to 1 
based on traditional probability logic. For instance, if the 
trust value of a node is 0.6, its complement probability 
which is distrust will be 0.4 according to traditional 
probability theory.  Sometimes, it is unrealistic to make that 
claim because the lack of knowledge about an event is not 
regarded as evidence supporting the distrust of a node. 
Instead, DST classifies 0.4 as uncertainty which means a 
node can either be trusted or untrusted. Hence, DST can 
better reflect the behavior of the node and can improve on 
the trust evaluation.  
First, nodes are classified into two states: Trusted ( )T  
and Untrusted ( )UT . So the frame of discernment   in 
DST consists of  ,T UT . The power set denoted by 2  
contains these four sets: 
 
       2 , , , ,T UT T UT       (6) 
 
The set represented by  ,T UT  denotes uncertainty in DST, 
which means that a node can be trusted or untrusted. We 
apply the direct trust values we obtained from (4) and 
indirect trust values obtained from (7) as Basic Probability 
Assignment (BPA) to denote the strength of evidence 
pertaining to a particular subset of 2 . In our scheme, trust 
value of 0.5 and above will be classified as trusted whereas 
trust value less than 0.5 will be classified as untrusted. For 
example, if the trust value of a node is 0.6, BPA for the set 
 T   will be 0.6. The remaining belief mass of 0.4 will be 
allocated to the set  ,T UT . Following this rule and using 
Dempster’s rule of combination in (8), direct trust and 
indirect trust can be combined to compute the overall trust 
value of a node. 
 
1,2 1 20
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where 1 20
( ) ( )
A B
K m A m B

  is the normalization 
factor to ensure the total sum of combined masses, 1,2 1m  ; 
1( )m A  and 2 ( )m B  each represent the BPA assigned to 
direct trust and indirect trust, respectively. 
G. Decision Making 
The overall trust value of a node is feedback to the 
routing protocol for routing decisions. If the overall trust 
value is   0.5, we conclude that node is trusted, else the 
node is misbehaving. If a node is detected as misbehaved, 
the trustor will add the misbehaved node to the blacklist. At 
the same time, it will broadcast a message throughout the 
network to inform other nodes of the blacklist nodes. Other 
nodes upon receiving the broadcast message will also put 
the misbehaved node in blacklist to avoid using it for all 
future communications. The trustor will also send a route 
error (RERR) message to notify the source node where 
another route discovery will be initiated to find a path free 
of malicious nodes.   
IV. SIMULATION 
All our simulations are performed using Network 
Simulator NS3 (v3.17) [18]. TEDS is integrated into AODV 
[20] of NS-3 [18]. Although AODV is used, our proposed 
trust system is independent of the underlying routing 
protocols. It is compatible with other routing protocols as it 
runs on top of any routing protocol. TEDS only triggers the 
underlying routing protocol to re-initiate a new route 
discovery upon detection of malicious nodes. To evaluate 
the performance of TEDS, we compared it with basic 
AODV that is without any trust mechanisms. 
A. Simulation Environment 
Our simulation environment consists of 100 nodes 
placed in a square grid manner. The distance between each 
adjacent node is 150m and the radio range of each node is 
250m. The source and destination nodes are located on the 
left and right side of the square grid. All nodes in our 
simulation environment are assumed static to model the 
WMN backbone infrastructure. We simulate a total of 10 
CBR flows between randomly selected source nodes on the 
left and randomly selected destination nodes on the right. 
The maximum packet per flow is configured as 300 with a 
packet generation rate of 4 packets/s. The start time of each 
flow is uniformly distributed between 30 seconds and 200 
seconds. A random number generator is used to randomly 
select the source and destination nodes as well as to locate 
the malicious nodes in the forwarding path between each 
source and destination pair. Simulations were performed for 
a period of 300s and each data point is an average of 10 runs 
unless otherwise stated. More simulation parameters are 
given in Table I. 
 
TABLE I. SIMULATION PARAMETERS 
Simulation tool NS-3 
Grid spacing 150m 
Data rate 16kbps 
Transmission range 250 m 
Network area 1500 m x 1500 m 
No: of nodes in the network 100 
Traffic 10 source-destination pairs 
Packet size 512 B 
Packet generation rate 4 packets/s 
Simulation time 300 s 
Traffic type CBR 
Transport protocol UDP 
Routing protocol AODV (disable HELLO) 
Mac protocol IEEE 802.11b 
Propagation loss model RangePropagationLossModel 
Physical layer YansWifiPhy channel 
Mobility Static 
 
The performance of TEDS is evaluated for the following 
cases. First, we study the performance when the network is 
under blackhole attack. Next, we examine the sensitivity of 
the trust interval on the performance of TEDS in terms of 
packet delivery ratio and routing overhead. The selection of 
trust interval determines how often TEDS computes and 
propagates the trust value in the network. For all these 
experiments, we made two assumptions. We assume that all 
source and destinations are trustworthy and the second 
assumption is that all nodes start off with a default trust 
rating of 0.5 at the initial state. 
B. Results and Discussions 
1) Performance Analysis under Blackhole Attacks 
We first evaluate the performance of TEDS under the 
effects of blackhole attacks and we compare the result with 
basic AODV without any trust mechanisms. We are 
interested in the Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR) and 
normalized routing overhead of TEDS compared to basic 
AODV. To simulate the blackhole attacks in NS-3, we 
configure the malicious nodes to send a RREP packet with a 
high sequence number such that it will be selected by the 
source node during route discovery. Subsequently, the 
malicious nodes will drop 100% of the data packets. The 
comparison was done by varying the number of blackhole 
nodes in our network and the blackhole nodes are randomly 
selected from the network area of 80 nodes discounting the 
source and destinations which are on opposite sides of the 
square grid.  
Fig. 4 shows the average PDR of TEDS compared with 
basic AODV. As shown in Fig. 4, the PDR decreases when 
the number of malicious nodes increases. When there are no 
malicious nodes in the network, we are able to achieve 
similar PDR performance for TEDS and AODV. As the 
number of malicious nodes increases, the PDR of TEDS 
decreases at a slower rate but still able to achieve about 30% 
improvement on the PDR compared to AODV. This shows 
that TEDS is capable of detecting and isolating malicious 
nodes using the trust mechanisms introduced. As more and 
more blackhole nodes are introduced into the network, 
TEDS’s performance also starts to decrease gradually; this 
is because as more blackhole nodes are being identified and 
isolated by TEDS, there remain fewer alternatives available 
for choosing the forwarding paths considering our network 
is a static environment. 
Fig. 5 compares the normalized routing overhead for 
TEDS and basic AODV when the network is under 
blackhole attacks. Based on Fig. 5, two observations can be 
made. First, the normalized routing overhead incurred by 
TEDS is higher than AODV. Second, the normalized 
routing overhead increases with increasing blackhole nodes 
in the network. The increase in normalized routing overhead 
is due to the following reasons:  (1) periodic exchange of 
trust information with neighboring nodes, (2) broadcast of 
trust control message to notify other nodes of blackhole 
nodes, so that they can isolate them and not use them for 
packet forwarding and (3) re-initiation of a new route 
 
Figure 4. PDR performance in the presence of blackhole nodes 
 
 
Figure 5. Normalized routing overhead in the presence of blackhole 
 nodes 
 
 
discovery upon detection of blackhole nodes. We further 
show the breakdown of the normalized routing overhead for 
TEDS into control packets introduced by our trust 
mechanism and control packets introduced by AODV. We 
conclude that the increase in normalized routing overhead 
for TEDS is mainly due to the trust related control packets 
which also increases proportionally with the increase of 
blackhole nodes in the network. This increase in overhead is 
in the acceptable range in exchange for higher security and 
higher PDR.  
2) Selection of Trust Interval 
In this experiment, we assess the sensitivity of the trust 
interval on the performance of TEDS. The trust interval 
determines how frequent we perform the trust computations 
and propagation of trust values in the network. We compare 
the PDR vs. trust interval with 10% blackhole nodes in the 
network. The trust interval is varied from 10s to 60s and 
each data point on the plot represents an average of 20 runs. 
Fig. 6 shows the PDR for TEDS by varying the trust 
interval period. The curve shows that the PDR is the highest 
when trust interval is 10s. Beyond 10s, the PDR starts to 
drop. The PDR is around 85% at trust interval of 10s 
compared to 60% when the trust interval is configured as 
60s. One reason is that, when trust query period is small, a 
malicious node will be detected earlier and hence less 
number of packets will be lost. As trust interval increases, 
more packets are lost due to the dropping behavior of the 
malicious nodes and that attributed to the drop in PDR as 
trust interval increases.  
Next, we examine the effects of trust interval on the 
routing overhead. The routing overhead in our case consists 
of control packets generated by TEDS (trust-related control 
packets) and AODV related control packets for route 
discovery and route maintenance (RREQ, RREP, RERR). 
From Fig. 7, we see that the number of routing control 
packets is the highest when the trust interval is at 10s and 
that it tapers off as the trust interval increases. The reason is 
that at smaller trust interval, nodes need to exchange and 
disseminate trust related control packets more frequently 
which resulted in the increase in routing overhead. Based on 
Fig. 6 and Fig. 7, we can have the following observation. 
There is a trade-off between PDR and routing overhead vs. 
the trust interval. High PDR is achieved when the trust 
interval is small but at smaller trust interval, the routing 
overhead is high which makes TEDS less efficient and more 
costly in resources. Here, we conclude that the optimum 
trust interval based on simulation is 20s. 
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
In this paper, we proposed a novel lightweight trust 
mechanism called TEDS to detect blackhole nodes in the 
forwarding path of a node. TEDS exploits the broadcast 
nature of wireless medium to listen promiscuously to the 
next node’s transmission to detect packet droppers. It uses 
Shannon entropy to derive the direct trust value of a node 
and we demonstrated how to combine direct trust and 
indirect trust to form a shared belief using Dempster’s rule of 
combination. Benefits of TEDS are that it is lightweight; 
uncertainty is quantified in the trust computations and it is 
portable. TEDS can be integrated into any routing protocols. 
Our simulation results show that TEDS can detect packet 
droppers and improved the packet delivery ratio of the 
network as the number of malicious nodes increases with 
minimum increase in normalized routing overhead. We 
further show that the optimum trust interval is 20s through 
simulation where TEDS is able to ensure high PDR with 
reasonable routing overhead. For future work, we plan to 
study collusion attacks such as cooperative blackhole or 
wormhole initiated by multiple attackers and to study the 
impact of node mobility on the performance of TEDS. 
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